A neurociência da moralidade na tomada de decisões jurídicas complexas e no desenho de políticas públicas

Erik Navarro

Resumo


O presente artigo trata da utilização da neurociência da moralidade (e do pragmatismo profundo, daí decalcado) como guia filosófico no desenho de políticas públicas. As matrizes teóricas aqui utilizadas são a economia do bem-estar, a análise econômica do direito e o utilitarismo. Relatando diversos experimentos neurocientíficos, demonstraremos como nosso cérebro incide sistematicamente em erros de julgamento que fazem crer na utilização preponderante de princípios de justiça no desenho de políticas públicas, em detrimento do aumento do bem-estar social. Inicialmente apresentaremos o novo campo filosófico conhecido como neurociência da moralidade. Após, descreveremos a forma dual de funcionamento do cérebro, demonstrando a origem de nossos instintos e sentimentos de justiça. Finalmente, revelaremos como o pragmatismo pode auxiliar no debate de questões difíceis para o desenho correto de políticas públicas, considerando a forma dual de funcionamento da mente, bem como os erros cognitivos a que estamos sujeitos, algo inédito no direito brasileiro. Concluiremos que teorias que conferem caráter preponderante a princípios de justiça nada mais são do que racionalizações de julgamentos intuitivos e imprecisos de nosso cérebro, de modo que devem ceder espaço para premissas utilitaristas no desenho de políticas públicas, que, por sua vez, precisam ser focadas exclusivamente no aumento do bem-estar social.

Palavras-chave


Direito. Neurociência. Economia. Bem-estar Social.

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Referências


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5102/rbpp.v8i2.5349

ISSN 2179-8338 (impresso) - ISSN 2236-1677 (on-line)

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